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Abstract 
This essay broadly considers gifts, giving, and gift economies, modern and pre-modern, from a 
mainstream (and behavioural) economics perspective. I present a selective survey of the literature 
focusing on six key points: 
1. Commercial transactions sustained by reputation are not easily distinguishable from gift exchange 
economies; 
2. Gift-giving allows the giver to accumulate goods that cannot be purchased commercially; 
3. When the giver retains some use, experience, or control over the gift, she shares in the 
consumption of it; 
4. Considering behavioural issues such as regret aversion, gift-giving may offer overlooked 
efficiencies that may balance out the deadweight losses from ‘inadequate gifts’; 
5. Aggregate (anonymous) giving can be an important signal of overall group identity and character; 
6. Historical modes of ‘giving under pressure’ offer insights for modern public policy and 
philanthropy. 
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This essay broadly considers gifts, giving, and gift economies, modern and 
pre-modern, from a mainstream (and behavioral) economics perspective. I 
present a selective survey of the literature focusing on six key points: 
1. Commercial transactions sustained by reputation are not easily distinguishable 
from gift exchange economies;  
2. Gift-giving allows the giver to accumulate goods that cannot be purchased 
commercially;  
3. When the giver retains some use, experience, or control over the gift, she 
shares in the consumption of it;  
4. Considering behavioural issues such as regret aversion, gift-giving may offer 
overlooked efficiencies that may balance out the deadweight losses from 
‘inadequate gifts’;  
5. Aggregate (anonymous) giving can be an important signal of overall group 
identity and character;  
6. Historical modes of ‘giving under pressure’ offer insights for modern public 
policy and philanthropy. 
Van de Ven presents a wide-ranging survey of several economic approaches 
to gift-giving in modern economies.
1
 He focuses on two main empirical features. 
The first is ‘inadequacy’: gifts often given in some form that are not optimal for 
the receiver, given the expense incurred. From the standard economic perspec-
tive, the recipient should always prefer a cash gift, as this allows her maximal 
freedom of choice, hence she can optimize her ‘utility’. Yet cash gifts are often 
taboo. The second feature is ‘non-reciprocity’: gifts are often given without the 
expectation of a gift or reward in return. He classifies six several competing 
classes of models of gift-giving, considering how well they can explain these two 
features.
2
  
Beginning with a key example, the first model he mentions is ‘altruism’, à la 
Becker, where “my state of happiness is dependent on that of the other”.3 
Although it can explain non-reciprocal giving,
4
 this model struggles with 
 
1 Van de Ven 2000. 
2 These are: 1. “Altruism – making other people happy”, 2. “Egoism I – exchange”, 3. 
“Egoism II – warm glow, social approval”, 4. “Strategical – signaling, building trust”, 5. 
“Fairness – norms, reducing inequity” and 6. “Survival – selection” (Van de Ven 2000, p. 
4). 
3 Becker 1974. 
4 Although Van de Ven doesn’t mention it, this model struggles to explain reciprocal 
giving, i.e., why two individuals would give each other gifts – only the ‘net gift’ should 
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‘inadequate’ giving; the altruist, seeking to maximize the utility of another, 
would presumably give her a cash gift. Note that an extreme interpretation of 
Andreoni’s “warm glow” model,5 where the donor gains utility over the amount 
she sacrifices without caring where it goes, would neither imply nor rule out 
inadequate giving. While the warm glow model offers some convenient theo-
retical results, it is essentially a black box, raising more questions than it 
answers. 
In the following sections I incorporate three more of Van de Ven’s 
classifications: altruism, a gift economy with symbolic utility, reputation, social 
approval, and signaling; I leave out the models of fairness and the evolutionary 
models (‘survival’) for space concerns. 
 
 
1. Personal exchanges, market exchanges, and gift economies 
 
Exchange is useful when two parties have different relative costs in 
producing one or another good, and/or they have different preferences over 
goods. If I value my last apple at two oranges, and you value your last orange at 
two apples, then if I give you an apple in exchange for your orange we are both 
better off. But, for a given amount of goods produced, the chain of exchanges 
that achieves efficiency may be long and complicated. Classical economists have 
labored to specify precise formal models and conditions under which free 
exchange can achieve this Pareto efficiency, in the sense that no one can be made 
better off without making someone else worse off. Even where these conditions 
hold, the efficient outcome may not be one that we would consider equitable. 
In modern systems these exchanges occur through a numeraire good – 
money. With large and functioning markets and a generally accepted currency, 
each person can buy and sell without having to find a precise coincidence of 
wants. If I have apples and want oranges, I do not have to look around and find 
someone has oranges and wants apples (i.e., barter); we can both go to the 
general marketplace to buy and sell. With the idealized efficient marketplace, we 
can do no better by making individual trades – just go to the market and you will 
get (or receive) the best price.  
However, this takes a lot for granted. Who is providing and monitoring the 
validity of this generally accepted currency? Who is setting up the marketplace 
and determining the prices at which the markets clear? Who is guaranteeing that 
the oranges I buy will be of the type and quality promised? Who ensures that my 
apples are not stolen as I bring them to the market, and that I am accurately 
informed as the prevailing price and paid for my apples? The canonical general 
equilibrium model involves a market in which no one has market power but all 
 
matter for this model.  
5 Andreoni 1990. 
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are ‘price takers’ and, crucially, the true quality of every item is common 
knowledge. There are no individual interactions but only a ‘Walrasian auction-
neer’ who finds the price at which demand equals supply in all markets.6 No one 
believes this is how even the largest, most standard, and most efficient markets 
actually work. The argument is that with greater numbers of buyers and sellers 
the outcomes will converge to those predicted by this model.  
Economic history has often been characterized, most prominently by Adam 
Smith, as a progression from self-sufficiency (within the family or close group) 
to barter to centralized, institutionalized, and globalized markets, with compli-
cated chains of contracts and ownership rights enforced by central governments 
and international institutions.
7
  
In institutionalized markets, with greater distance between buyer and seller, 
there is less opportunity to develop a relationship that may permit trust. In the 
game theoretical sense, with a single interaction both parties will act in their own 
best interests. If we cannot immediately observe fruit quality, I will give you a 
rotten apple, and you give me a rotten orange. The idealized markets cannot 
easily deal with this problem of asymmetric information and there will be 
inefficiency – mutually beneficial trades will not take place.8  
However in indefinitely repeated games, ‘cooperation’ can be (but need not 
be) sustained in equilibrium.
9
 If we are patient enough, each party may sacrifice 
her immediate interest in favor of a continued relationship. I will give you the 
good apple and you will give me the good orange because we have the mutual 
‘common knowledge’ understanding that if either of us gives rotten fruit, in any 
future interaction we will never give fresh fruit again. Note that this refers to a 
specific relationship between two individuals, and not a general system of laws 
or customs. 
In models where some agents have reciprocal or other-regarding preferences, 
substantiated in much experimental work, there is an even stronger incentive to 
‘play nice’. Here, even if we both know that our interaction is coming to an end, 
we also know that some people want to reward good behavior and punish bad 
behavior, even if it does not directly increase their own wealth. Thus, even if we 
are selfish, we may give the good fruit just in case our partner turns out to be one 
of these reciprocators. And we also will want to convince the other fellow that 
 
6 For an intermediate textbook explanation of Walrasian equilibrium, see, e.g., Nicholson 
– Snyder 201111, pp. 457-497. The original theory was formulated by Walras 19264. The 
term ‘Walrasian auctioneer’ may have originated with Leijonhufvud 1967. 
7 Smith 1776. Although this progression seems logical, there is some argument over the 
historical accuracy of this. As discussed throughout this volume there is debate over the 
extent to which gift exchanges, with or without an explicit quid pro quo, served as a 
bridge, consisted an economy in itself, or coexisted with other forms of exchange 
8 Akerlof 1970. 
9 Fudenberg – Maskin 1986. 
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we ourselves will reciprocate.
10
 
This repeated relationship, where I give you a quality product in exchange for 
your quality product (or monetary payment), is in one sense very much like a gift 
exchange. In fact, in these models such cooperation need not result from an 
explicit quid pro quo, nor a reckoning after each period, as long as we are patient 
and we have a mutual understanding that good behavior will be reciprocated 
down the road. We do not need a formal agreement that I will give you an apple 
every Monday, and you will give me an orange every Friday; this can take the 
form of one gift following another, ad infinitum.
11
  
To sum up, a repeated ‘commercial’ exchange sustained by reputation and 
reciprocation concerns may not be terribly distinct from a repeated ‘gift 
exchange’. Here I refer to a ‘gift economy’ mainly driven by self-interest, essen-
tially constituting an alternate form of exchange (but as noted above, perhaps 
strengthened by other-regarding preferences). One might alternately imagine a 
gift economy, or gift-giving relationship, where altruism plays the dominant role; 
for example, within an immediate family. Other cases may be intermediate, as 
within a small tribe or between friendship groups.
12
  
Van de Ven’s second category (which he calls “egoism I”) begins with a gifts 
economy as in Kranton.
13
 He extends this (especially in Van de Klundert and Van 
de Ven) to consider the benefits of gift exchange in a social context
14
 – my 
discussion below largely falls into this category. Even where a gift exchange 
appears to provide less ‘substantive utility’ than a comparable market exchange, 
the seeming inadequacy may disappear when we also add in ‘symbolic utility’.  
While a strict exchange-based approach does not allow for non-reciprocal giving, 
the symbolic benefits to the giver (and other benefits discussed below) may 
justify this. 
 
 
 
10 An initial gift can serve as a signal that one is averse to cheating, as in Camerer – 
Weigelt 1988; we return to this later. Gift giving in the Roman world (as shown in this 
book by K. Verboven) may have served this role in the absence of formal enforcement 
institutions. 
11 Kranton 1996 offers a formal model of this sort of gift economy. Arrow 1973 among 
others, has argued that this sense of ‘social responsibility’ is vital to economic efficiency. 
Recent work, e.g., Guiso – Sapienza – Zingales 2006, argues that a common knowledge of 
trust and trustworthiness, perhaps ‘social capital’, is important to modern economic 
development. Akerlof 1982 argues that labor contracts and ‘efficiency wages’ can be seen 
in terms of a gift exchange. 
12 A gift giving relationship might evolve into an explicitly recognized quid pro quo, 
which might evolve into an institutional market; this relationship is considered in a 
Roman context by Verboven in this volume. 
13 Kranton 1996. 
14 Van de Klundert – Van de Ven 1999. 
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2. Reputation and other rewards 
 
The standard economic model considers a single maximization decision for 
each individual. Individuals do not separately maximize in distinct spheres, such 
as health, goods consumption, and reputation, but always consider the trade-offs 
both within and between these categories.
15
 However, we typically model 
diminishing returns to consumption of each good, and some goods are seen as 
‘necessities’ – as the consumption of a necessity, say water, approaches zero, the 
individual would be willing to give up nearly anything else to get a small glass of 
water. 
For the ‘markets are efficient’ predictions to come to bear, we require that 
every good (more broadly ‘everything we care about’) can be privately owned, 
priced, and traded, and one person’s consumption comes at the expense of 
another’s. But some things are difficult or impossible to buy or sell directly. 
Other goods are taboo to trade.
16
 In particular, one cannot go to a store to 
purchase a good reputation.  
In ancient and modern times prestige and reputation are seen as valuable in 
themselves (in addition to their instrumental value in influencing others and 
getting better treatment in a variety of spheres, including commercial transact-
tions). In a sense we can directly ‘eat our reputation’. Gifts and donations may be 
an indirect way of buying reputation. In signaling models, if some get more 
direct pleasure from giving then others, these ‘good types’ can separate them-
selves from the selfish types through their giving. A pair of individuals engaged 
in a repeat of high-stakes gift exchange can also signal to one another, and to 
outsiders, their mutual trust and trustworthiness. Everyone can see that either 
party could ‘quit while she is ahead’, yet they do not, demonstrating their 
trustworthiness. Their trustworthiness may be driven by regard for one another 
specifically or as fellow humans, regard for principle, religious or moral values, 
and their patience and confidence in the long-term relationship. Some combina-
tion of these admirable traits – each of which suggests future trustworthiness – is 
being publicly signaled. This is exemplified by Bertelli’s paper in the present 
volume: through gift exchange two men can sustain and increase the public 
perception of their esteem (τιμή). 
The more well-regulated and rule-based the transactions are, the less they 
allow people to demonstrate their trustworthiness. In a formal market each 
transaction is carefully monitored by a government regulation or a private 
authority. Where there is no scope to cheat there is no scope to prove one's 
honesty. Gift exchanges as well as less regulated transactions may offer such 
 
15 Although in a particular instance we may limit ourselves to a narrow choice set and use 
simple heuristics. 
16 Roth 2007 calls these “repugnant transactions”. This is relevant to the transfer of relics 
(see Carlà’s contribution in this volume), and the teaching of philosophy (see Blank’s 
article). 
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benefits.
17
 
This discussion relates to Van de Ven’s third category: “social approval”. His 
depiction has the flavor of a zero-sum game, here social status is only gained at 
the expense of another. However, this is one of numerous models where giving 
conveys status or reputation (see, e.g., Harbaugh in the philanthropy context).
18
  
In his game-theoretic equilibrium the less-wealthy player can be driven out of 
this ‘giving game’ leading to non-reciprocal giving; inadequate gifts can also be 
explained under given assumptions.
19
  
 
 
3. Gifts and shared consumption 
 
Fireworks are often considered a ‘public good’, being largely non-excludable 
(people who do not purchase them see them anyways) and non-rival (my seeing 
the fireworks does not reduce your ability to see them). However, every year 
millions of people purchase and light fireworks on holidays such as New Years, 
Independence Day, and Guy Fawkes Night; abundant public displays are follo-
wed by families setting off their own small rockets. Presumably there is a parti-
cular enjoyment from ‘ownership’ – specifying exactly where and when they are 
set off, and knowing that you are the cause of the flash and bang. Dur and Glazer 
model the relevance of this ‘desire for impact’ in the work environment,20 citing 
a range of psychologists and social scientists; McCleland in particular.
21
  
Gift-giving may have a similar nature. Even though the receiver may be 
wearing the sweater, the giver has chosen its color and brand, may enjoy seeing 
it worn, and may enjoy the sense of impact. The giver may also specify the way 
it is to be used, retaining some control, i.e., ‘ownership’.22 In this way the con-
sumption or the use value may be shared through a gift exchange, bringing costs 
and benefits not offered by a market exchange.    
 
 
4. The Deadweight Loss/Gain of Christmas and Bounded Rationality 
 
Some economists are puzzled by the ubiquity of gift-giving. Waldfogel has 
 
17 Bowles 1998 makes a related point. Van de Klundert – Van de Ven 1999 model an 
equilibrium where some goods are exchanged via a gift economy and others through a 
market economy; however, the distinction may not always be so clear.  
18 Harbaugh 1998b. 
19 The story: making my gift less beneficial to you makes you less well-off, giving you a 
higher utility of own-consumption, making it relatively more expensive to give, 
improving my position in the giving game.  
20 Dur – Glazer 2008. 
21 McCleland 1988. 
22 The peculium offers in interesting example; see Fleckner in the present volume. 
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prominently noted and tried to estimate the “deadweight loss of Christmas”, 
extrapolating from a survey on a select group of students.
23
 The essential argu-
ment is that, at best, the giver will choose the object that the receiver would have 
chosen with the money, and more likely, if the giver does not perfectly under-
stand the preferences of the recipient, the gift will be mismatched. In the termi-
nology of Van de Ven,
24
 the gift will be “inadequate”, offering less pleasure to 
the recipient then she could have obtained herself with the same expenditure.  
Others have questioned Walfogel’s empirical findings,25 instead finding a 
gain in value over the cost of the gifts. The standard explanation for this is that 
gifts gain a sentimental or symbolic value. Other gains may accrue to the giver, 
such as the shared consumption benefits and signaling benefits considered above, 
or the ability to signal one’s understanding of the receiver’s tastes and needs.26 
A further benefit to the receiver arises in the context of bounded rationality, 
in particular considering ‘regret aversion’.27 Choosing to consume a luxurious 
good may lead both to feelings of guilt and regret. Indeed, for many people 
simply the act of handing over money is painful. It forces the consumer to 
consider what she is sacrificing (her ‘opportunity cost’) in making this choice. 
And she may have built-in feelings of guilt in spending (this may be a mecha-
nism to counter myopia and even a survival mechanism).
28
  
If she is given a cash gift, this may go immediately into the ‘general account’. 
And then if and when it is spent on a luxurious good, the joy of enjoying this 
good (e.g., drinking the $100 bottle of champagne) may be mitigated by the 
accompanying guilt in spending, and perhaps regret afterwards.  On the other 
hand, if a person is given a fine wine as a gift, there is little choice but to con-
sume it (at some point) – selling it would be both gauche and a considerable ef-
fort (and probably involve a financial loss relative to the retail price). Hence the 
recipient can enjoy the wine without the accompanying feeling of guilt, nor 
regret – she did not choose to purchase the wine herself. Similarly, if she gets a 
gift certificate to Victoria’s Secret, she can purchase fripperies without worrying 
about whether this was the ‘best’ use of her money.   
This argument is undermined if the individual can direct the gifts she will 
receive (she could have asked for simple socks and underwear and not lingerie) 
or she experiences equivalent regret over the giver's decision (“he wasted his 
hard-earned money”). But directed gift-giving is often discouraged and many 
 
23 Waldfogel 1993. 
24 Van de Ven 2000. 
25 Solnick – Hemenway 1996; List – Shogren 1998.  
26 Ed Glaeser made this final point in a New York Times Op-Ed., In Defense of Holiday 
Gift-Giving (29 Dec. 2009). This is echoed in the discussion of the “exchange of 
culturally appropriate and valued ... greeting gifts” in Bronze Age Cyprus: see Steel 2013, 
p. 7. 
27 Samuelson – Zeckhauser 1988. 
28 Suvorov – Van de Ven 2008. 
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individuals express a preference for being surprised – further distancing 
themselves from the decision. It seems likely that, concerning regret, the reci-
pient is at least somewhat distanced from the giver, so she feels less difficulty re-
ceiving the lingerie than purchasing it herself. She can persuade herself that the 
giver “enjoyed the act of giving”. In fact, the institutionalized giving itself di-
stances givers and recipients from the decision – “it's Christmas, I had to give 
something” is a convenient justification for extravagance. This argument also 
helps explain the popularity of credit cards that give ‘hotel points’ or frequent 
flyer miles, instead of just cash back. It is a ‘sneaky’ way to fool myself into 
putting something aside that I can only spend luxuriously, and it feels less like I 
am making a conscious decision to put money aside for frivolities. Note that the 
limited nature of holidays and birthdays, and the distancing aspect of gift-giving 
allows alleviation of the potential excesses of guilt and goal-setting without a 
complete abandonment of these rules and feelings which may be, on the whole, 
beneficial for survival and long term welfare.  
I illustrate this point with a very basic model and example. Consider a 
‘psychological’ utility function U(x,y) with two arguments (two goods), that is 
constructed from another ‘material’ utility function v(x,y). 
 
                          
 
where:  
 
                                      standard constraints  
 
Essentially, the psychological utility U(x,y) represents the material utility 
from the choice made (x,y), subtracting a fraction of the utility of the next-best 
choice. This represents the utility of someone who feels a personal loss when 
considering what she sacrificed when making her choice. 
 
Example:                                           , with income     
and no other constraints, unit prices, budget constraint:      . 
 
Optimization of U(x,y)  here leads to consumption              , second 
choice               and resulting utility                          
       In comparison, with the additional constraint y=0  (or constraint x=1) we 
get the same consumption but utility                         . This 
example illustrates that the ‘gift certificate’ that constrains choice may increase 
utility. 
 
 
5. Public (or anonymous) giving to signal values and support 
 
Van de Ven’s fourth approach, “gifts as signaling device”, following, e.g., 
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Camerer,
29
 involves a gift as a preamble to a later interaction requiring mutual 
investments. This assumes individuals have different ‘types’, and ‘honest types’ 
prefer to cooperate when others do, while ‘cheaters’ always prefer not to 
cooperate. Here the gift serves as a way for the honest to make themselves better 
off by separating themselves from the cheaters. For this ‘separation’ to work we 
require that an honest player gains more from convincing others she is honest 
than a cheater would gain from convincing them of this. This approach permits 
reciprocal or non-reciprocal giving: either in an individual interaction (when the 
honest type wastes her signal on a cheater) or regularly (if one group is seen as 
trustworthy enough ex ante so as not to need to signal). It can also explain 
inadequacy: mutual exchange of valuable gifts may not be a truly costly signal.   
The above approach fails to explain anonymous giving. Hugh-Jones and 
Reinstein consider the benefit of taking a costly action, here called a “ritual,” that 
is observed only in its aggregate: 
 
“Suppose … that conditional cooperators gain more from inducing others’ future 
cooperation. Then, performing the ritual may send a signal that ‘there is one 
additional cooperator in the group’, and only conditional cooperators may perform 
the ritual, justifying this belief”.
30
 
 
Making an anonymous gift to charity, doing a random act of kindness, or 
taking care of a public resource may let other conditional cooperators know that 
they are not alone.
31
 This may improve future cooperation, particularly where it 
cannot be easily enforced.  In particular, we envision:  
 
“…difficult or propitious periods, in which the present benefits of selfishness may 
outweigh the future costs of a breakdown of cooperation. … poor harvests, 
…bankruptcy, …a prolonged strike, and … frontline combat”.32 
 
The authors argue that earlier anonymous contributions are more informative 
than public ones. While selfish types may feel compelled to give when giving is 
public – to preserve their reputation and avoid being excluded, when giving is 
anonymous only the intrinsically motivated, conditional cooperators (or altruists) 
will give. Thus, when giving is anonymous, the aggregate rate of giving will be a 
more accurate signal that may allow better future coordination. However, this 
holds under the specified conditions where greater knowledge of others’ types 
 
29 Camerer 1988. 
30 Hugh-Jones – Reinstein 2010. 
31 Religious gifts to the gods in Ancient Greece, often of substantial value, publicly 
recorded, and typically presented without a name or text, may have served this function – 
see I. Berti in this volume. Also see M. Gori’s article on Late Bronze Age bronze hoards 
and M. Satlow’s contribution on tithing in Roman Palestine, although the latter seems to 
have conferred a variety of potential benefits. 
32 Hugh-Jones – Reinstein 2013. 
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(preferences) helps on average; in alternative cases ignorance is preferable.  
 
 
6. Gifts of public goods and taxation  
 
In the standard model, individuals contribute to a Pure Public Good, which 
has two defining characteristics. (1) It is non-rival – everyone derives a benefit 
from the aggregate provision and one person’s use does not reduce another’s 
benefit; (2) It is non-excludable: no one can be shut out from using it.  If the 
welfare of the poor is a general concern, services (or direct transfers) for the 
needy may also fall into this category. However, many goods provided by 
government, such as health care and education, arguably do not. This definition 
is strict; even the strongest examples – such as a radio broadcast or public 
defense – may not exactly meet these definitions. But even impure public goods, 
with some congestion and or some ability to exclude, are thought to be 
underprovided by the market in general.  
This is often labeled the ‘free-rider’ problem: if the contributor does not 
derive the full benefit of her contribution, the aggregate contribution will fall 
short of the efficient provision. Depending on relative preferences and the slope 
of the benefit functions, contributions, even from the selfish, may be non-zero. 
For example, I may put a streetlight in front of my house because my private 
benefit exceeds the cost, even if I ignore the benefit for the rest of the town. 
However, this will be, in general, suboptimal.
33
 If all members of society could 
be compelled to give somewhat more, all would be better off. But, at equilibrium 
– where the good is underprovided – no individual will have an incentive to 
unilaterally contribute any more.  
Enforced taxation is seen as a response to the aforementioned free-riding 
problem. If individual benefits of each type of public good can be measured (this 
is itself a difficult mechanism design information aggregation problem), these 
can be sponsored by the government and paid for through general tax revenue. 
Thus, in theory, allocative efficiency – the right mix of private and public goods 
– can be achieved. However, the information aggregation problem remains, as do 
difficult issues of public choice. The political environment might not be trusted 
to make the right decisions, and the policymakers to implement these efficiently. 
Furthermore, in order to redistribute to the poor, taxes (or benefits) basically 
must depend on individual choices; e.g., my income tax bill depends on my 
income which in turn depends in part on my hours worked. Thus the tax system 
may cause distortions. I might farm for only 30 hours per week if there is a 25% 
tax, even though I would be willing to farm for an additional ten hours if I were 
 
33 In addition, there may be coordination problems: I might be better off buying one 
streetlamp if my neighbor does not, but I may prefer to wait to see if she will buy it first. 
Here the equilibrium predicts one of us will buy the streetlamp, but the coordination may 
not be easily resolved. 
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allowed to keep all of the additional produce. 
Where does this leave charitable giving and philanthropy? Is it something the 
government should encourage? Such gifts have been interpreted as driven by the 
desire to attain private benefits from supplementing a public good.
34
 However, 
this interpretation is problematic, particularly in explaining large individual vo-
luntary contributions to causes with diffuse benefits.
35
 Essentially, in contrast to a 
reasonable interpretation of the public goods model, some individuals give far 
too much, give to too wide a selection of charities,
36
 and donations seem to be 
not substantially ‘crowded out’ by other contributions. Furthermore, there is 
strong experimental and observational evidence that giving is driven by other 
motivations. These include reputation-seeking,
37
 reciprocity,
38
 personal social 
pressure,
39
 and empathy.
40
 There is also some evidence made that people donate 
to improve their self-image (‘self-signaling’)41 and apply self-serving justifyca-
tions to avoid donating.
42
  
Should we exert strong pressure and offer incentives to encourage charitable 
giving, or should we rely on the modern welfare state?  If public aid ‘crowds out’ 
or substitutes for private giving, or if strongly encouraging private giving leads 
to a smaller government, this is an important concern, motivating several further 
questions. Is private provision more or less efficient then government provision? 
Which leads to greater individual satisfaction, on the part of the donors or 
taxpayers? (There is some debate, however, over whether this ‘warm glow’ 
should be included in policy considerations).
43
 Which has a less distorting effect 
on other decisions, particularly the labor-leisure choice? 
Recent work considers the incentive effects of ‘taxation’ or enforced 
contributions – on real effort and on additional contributions – in laboratory 
settings and small-scale field settings.
44
 The USA’s Negative Income Tax experi-
ments found strong income and substitution effects of taxation.
45
 However, none 
of these offered a direct comparison of examined the response of effort to kno-
wing you would be asked,
46
 nor compared this effect to that of enforced contri-
 
34 Becker 1974. 
35 Sugden 1982; Andreoni 1990; Duncan 2004; Atkinson 2009. 
36 Reinstein 2011. 
37 Harbaugh 1998a. 
38 Falk 2007. 
39 DellaVigna – List – Malmendier 2012.  
40 Andreoni – Rao 2010. 
41 Gneezy – Gneezy – Riener – Nelson 2012. 
42 Fong – Oberholzer-Gee 2011. 
43 Andreoni 2006. 
44 McKenzie 2008; Kossmeier – Ariely – Bracha 2009; Hall 2010; Blumkin – Ruffle – 
Ganun 2012; He 2012; Tonin – Vlassopoulos 2012. 
45 Robins 1985.  
46 Tonin – Vlassopoulos 2012 field experiment does examine the response to a variety of 
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butions. 
David Cameron’s “Big Society” speech47 mentions both “the harm that 
means-tested benefits do to work incentives” and the desire to “create a new so-
cial norm around volunteering or charitable giving”. An implicit assumption here 
is that encouraging charitable giving will not also impact incentives and the 
labor/leisure tradeoff. Such an effect would arise naturally from the models and 
evidence of recent authors,
48
 where being the target of fundraising may reduce 
my welfare, although it induces me to donate. Other experiments have elicited a 
positive price that subjects are willing to pay avoid making a decision in a 
dictator game.
49
 This disincentive is likely to play a greater role in a society that 
relies less on a tax-funded welfare state and relies more on aggressive fund-
raising, family, community, and religious pressure to induce giving and sharing. 
In pre-Welfare State societies, there were often strong expectations and obliga-
tions on patrons, landowners, and the heads of large family groups. Informal 
insurance arrangements in present-day low-income agrarian economies may also 
affect incentives.
50
 
There is a longstanding debate over the incentives, efficiency, and virtues of 
relying on taxation versus encouraging voluntary contributions to fund public 
services and poor relief.
51
 Another argument concerns the merits of personalized 
and connected giving versus institutionalized giving (e.g., giving locally to 
individuals and small charities versus giving to UNICEF).  Historically, there has 
been a third category, sometimes called ‘liturgy’. Wealthy and prominent citizens 
in the Greek world were essentially required to provide public goods, but they 
were able to claim these as their gifts, and claim some ownership and control 
over them. 
Here I consider three dimensions of the personal benefit of giving, and how 
different institutions can satisfy this better or worse. The first aspect is the 
voluntary nature, the idea that I can choose whether or not to make the donation; 
this may motivate giving in various models, including ‘self signaling’. A second 
aspect is the public recognition. A third aspect is the personal connectedness to 
the gift; this includes whether one can claim it as their own gift, whether one can 
 
private incentives, automatic contributions, and commitments to contribute at a certain 
rate. However (i) they do not consider the anticipation of being asked ex-post, (ii) They 
use between-subject variation, vulnerable to demand and contrast effects, (iii) they do not 
directly compare a tax and donation regime that raises the same amount and (iv) their 
field experiment does not offer methodological guidance for future lab work. 
47 http://www.conservatives.com/News/Speeches/2009/11/David_Cameron_The_Big_So-
ciety.aspx; last access 13 Aug. 2013. 
48 Della Vigna – List – Malmendier 2009; von Kotzebue – Wigger 2008; Tonin – 
Vlassopoulos 2010. 
49 Broberg – Ellingsen –Johannesson 2007. 
50 Coate – Ravallion 1993. 
51 Vickrey 1962; Hall 2010.  
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make decisions over its character and use, and whether one sees its direct impact 
on others in incremental sense. In the table below I note how these aspects are 
differently bundled in various modern and ancient institutions.  
 
 
Patronage Liturgy “Local” or 
individual 
donation 
“UNICEF” Taxation 
Voluntary 
choice 
Yes/Maybe No Yes Yes No 
Public 
recognition 
Yes Yes Maybe Little No 
Personal 
connection 
Yes Yes Yes No No 
 
The voluntary choice aspect is clearly removed through taxation, but it may 
also arguably be removed through great social pressure. If one is compelled to 
give, they may no longer derive some of the self-satisfaction of having chosen to 
give. The voluntary aspect is also removed in the Greek institution of ‘liturgy’.52 
There is neurological evidence that the hedonic benefits of giving stem, in part, 
from the voluntary nature of the contribution.
53
 
Private and personal giving – evolving away from euergetism (see Colpaert 
in the present volume, who claims this is removed from the modern economy), 
and away from patronage, has largely been institutionalized in modern times. 
The church played some role in doing this, when private giving was channeled 
through the power of bishops. ‘Giving’ through taxation is clearly institution-
nalized. Larger organizations like UNICEF have also depersonalized giving, re-
moving the connection between giving, empathy, and a feeling of ownership. 
The liturgy institution may have preserved this while taking away the voluntary 
aspect. There is evidence that visible impact, a personal connection,
54
 and the 
ability to make choices are important drivers of giving,
55
 and that these are 
 
52 See here L. Cecchet. 
53 Harbaugh – Mayr – Burghart 2007. 
54 Jenni – Loewenstein 1997. 
55 Anecdotally, we can observe the success of organizations like “DonorsChoose.org”, 
which allows specifically targeted gifts to US school classrooms, and claims to have 
raised over $175 million http://www.donorschoose.org/about/impact.html (accessed 13 
Apr. 2013).  Kiva.org offers the opportunity to choose to lend to a small entrepreneur, 
underwent some controversy when it was discovered that the loans had already been 
arranged in advance and the lender's choice did not affect this. There was a similar 
controversy in the late 1990s when “several child sponsorship organizations amended 
their disclosures after a series of articles in The Chicago Tribune revealed that while they 
were soliciting money to sponsor a specific needy child, that child was not necessarily 
receiving the money directly”.  The New York Times, November 9, 2009, “Confusion on 
Where Money Lent via Kiva Goes”, by Stephanie Strom. 
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crucial to the emotional benefits of giving.
56
   
Public recognition is absent from most tax regimes, and to an extent absent 
from large charitable gifts, and lessened through institutions that encourage 
anonymous giving. Here liturgy is interesting, as it may preserve the public 
recognition and personal connection aspects, while removing the voluntary 
aspect, alleviating free-riding problems.   
 
 
Bibliography 
 
Akerlof, George A.: The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics 84 (1970), pp. 488-500.  
Akerlof, George A.: Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange, in: The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 97 (1982), pp. 543-569. 
Aknin, Lara B. – Elizabeth W. Dunn – Ashley V. Whillans – Adam M. Grant – Michael I. 
Norton: Making a Difference Matters: Impact Unlocks the Emotional Benefits of 
Prosocial Spending, in: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 88 (2013), pp. 
90-95. 
Andreoni, James: Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-
Glow Giving, in: The Economic Journal 100 (1990), pp. 464-477. 
Andreoni, James: Philanthropy. Handbook of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism, 
Amsterdam 2006. 
Andreoni, James – Justin M. Rao: The Power of Asking: How Communication Affects 
Selfishness, Empathy, and Altruism, in: Journal of Public Economics 95 (2010), pp. 
513-520. 
Arrow, Kenneth J.: Social Responsibility and Economic Efficiency, in: Public Policy 21 
(1973), pp. 303-317. 
Atkinson, Anthony B.: Giving Overseas and Public Policy, in: Journal of Public 
Economics 93 (2009), pp. 647-653. 
Becker, Gary S.: A Theory of Social Interactions, in: The Journal of Political Economy 82 
(1974), pp. 1063-1093. 
Blumkin, Tomer – Bradley J. Ruffle – Yosef Ganun: Are Income and Consumption Taxes 
Ever Really Equivalent? Evidence from a Real-Effort Experiment with Real Goods, in: 
European Economic Review 56 (2012), pp. 1200-1219. 
Bowles, Samuel: Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and 
Other Economic Institutions, in: Journal of Economic Literature 36 (1998), pp. 75-111. 
Broberg, Tomas – Tore Ellingsen – Magnus Johannesson: Is generosity involuntary?, in: 
Economics Letters 94 (2007), pp. 32-37. 
Camerer, Colin: Gifts as Economic Signals and Social Symbols, in: American Journal of 
Sociology 94 (1988), Supplement: Organizations and Institutions: Sociological and 
Economic Approaches to the Analysis of Social Structure, pp. S180-S214. 
Camerer, Colin – Keith Weigelt: Experimental Tests of a Sequential Equilibrium 
Reputation Model, in: Econometrica 56 (1988), pp. 1-36. 
Coate, Stephen – Martin Ravallion: Reciprocity without Commitment: Characterization 
 
56 Aknin – Dunn – Whillans – Grant – Norton 2013. 
  
 
 
 
The Economics of the Gift    15 
and Performance of Informal Insurance Arrangements, in: Journal of Development 
Economics 40 (1993), pp. 1-24. 
DellaVigna, Stefano – John A. List – Ulrike Malmendier: Testing for Altruism and Social 
Pressure in Charitable Giving, NBER Working Paper 15629 (2009) [http://www.nber.org 
/papers/w15629; last access 19 Aug. 2013]. 
DellaVigna, Stefano – John A. List – Ulrike Malmendier: Testing for Altruism and Social 
Pressure in Charitable Giving, in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics 127 (2012), pp. 
1-56. 
Duncan, Brian: A Theory of Impact Philanthropy, in: Journal of Public Economics 88 
(2004), pp. 2159-2180. 
Dur, Robert A. J. – Amihai Glazer: The Desire for Impact, in: Journal of Economic 
Psychology 29 (2008), pp. 285-300. 
Falk, Armin: Gift Exchange in the Field, in: Econometrica 75 (2007), pp. 1501-1511. 
Fong, Christina – Felix Oberholzer-Gee: Truth in Giving: Experimental Evidence on the 
Welfare Effects of Informed Giving to the Poor, in: Journal of Public Economics 95 
(2011), pp. 436-444. 
Fudenberg, Drew – Eric Maskin: The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting 
or with Incomplete Information, in: Econometrica 54 (1986), pp. 533-554. 
Gneezy, Ayelet – Uri Gneezy – Gerhard Riener – Leif D. Nelson: Pay-What-You-Want, 
Identity, and Self-Signaling in Markets, in: Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of the United States of America 109 (2012), pp. 7236-7240. 
Guiso, Luigi – Paola Sapienza – Luigi Zingales: Does Culture Affect Economic 
Outcomes?, in: The Journal of Economic Perspectives 20 (2006), pp. 23-48. 
Hall, Daniel T.: The Efficiency-Equality Tradeoff in Public Sector Charity Provision, in: 
Research in Experimental Economics 13 (2010), pp. 77-111. 
Harbaugh, William T.: The Prestige Motive for Making Charitable Transfers, in: 
American Economic Review 88 (1998a), pp. 277-282. 
Harbaugh, William T.: What do Donations Buy? A Model of Philanthropy Based on 
Prestige and Warm Glow, in: Journal of Public Economics 67 (1998b), pp. 269-84. 
Harbaugh, William T. – Ulrich Mayr – Daniel R. Burghart: Neural Responses to Taxation 
and Voluntary Giving Reveal Motives for Charitable Donations, in: Science 316 (2007), 
pp. 1622-1625. 
He, Tai-Sen: Tax or Transfer? The Framing Effect of Redistribution Policy: Experimental 
Evidence, Job Market Paper (2012) [http://www.econ.brown.edu/students/Tai-
Sen_he/jmp.pdf; last access 19 Aug. 2013]. 
Hugh-Jones, David – David A. Reinstein: The Benefit of Anonymity in Public Goods 
Games, Working Paper. University of Essex, Department of Economics, Discussion 
Papers 689 (2010) 
[http://davidreinstein.files.wordpress.com/2011/05/secret_santa_experiment_ may.pdf; 
last access 19 Aug. 2013]. 
Hugh-Jones, David – David A. Reinstein: Targeted Exclusion Can Reduce Cooperation in 
Public Goods Games, Mimeo (2013) [http://www.webmeets.com/files/papers/res/ 
2013/13/Anonymity%20in%20PG%20Games%20Hugh-Jones%20and%20Reinstein 
%20%20Feb%202013%20update.pdf; last access 19 Aug. 2013]. 
Jenni, Karen – George Loewenstein: Explaining the Identifiable Victim Effect, in: Journal 
of Risk and Uncertainty 14 (1997), pp. 235-257. 
Kossmeier, Stephan – Dan Ariely – Anat Bracha: Doing Good or Doing Well? Image 
  
 
 
 
16    David Reinstein 
 
Motivation and Monetary Incentives in Behaving Prosocially, in: American Economic 
Review 99 (2009), pp. 544-555. 
Kranton, Rachel E.: Reciprocal Exchange: A Self-Sustaining System, in: American 
Economic Review 86 (1996), pp. 830-851. 
Leijonhufvud, Axel: Keynes and the Keynesians: A suggested interpretation, in: American 
Economic Review 57 (1967), pp. 401-410. 
List, John A. – Jason F. Shogren: The Deadweight Loss of Christmas: Comment, in: 
American Economic Review 88 (1998), pp. 1350-1355. 
McClelland, David C.: Human motivations, Cambridge 1988. 
McKenzie, Tom: Tax or Beg? Mandatory Payments to Charity and their Effects on Donor 
Behavior, NCVO/VSSN Researching the Voluntary Sector 2009 (2008) [http://www. 
ncvo-vol.org.uk/sites/default/files/UploadedFiles/Research_Events/McKenzie.pdf, last 
access 19 Aug. 2013]. 
Nicholson, Walter – Christopher M, Snyder: Microeconomic Theory: Basic Principles and 
Extensions, Stamford 201111. 
Reinstein, David A.: Does One Charitable Contribution Come at the Expense of 
Another?, in: The BE Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy 11 (2011), pp. 1-54. 
Robins, Philip K.: A Comparison of the Labor Supply Findings from the Four Negative 
Income Tax Experiments, in: Journal of Human Resources 20 (1985), pp. 567-582. 
Roth, Alvin E.: Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets, in: Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 21 (2007), pp. 37-58.  
Samuelson, William – Richard Zeckhauser: Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, in: 
Journal of risk and uncertainty 1 (1988), pp. 7-59. 
Smith, Adam: An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, London 
1776. 
Solnick, Sara J. – David Hemenway: The Deadweight Loss of Christmas: Comment, in: 
American Economic Review 86 (1996), pp. 1299-1305. 
Steel, Louise: Materiality and Consumption in the Bronze Age Mediterranean, New York 
– London 2013. 
Sugden, Robert: On the Economics of Philanthropy, in: Economic Journal 92 (1982), pp. 
341-350. 
Suvorov, Anton – Jeroen Van de Ven: Goal Setting as a Self-Regulation Mechanism, 
Working Paper (2008) [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1286029, 
last access 19 Aug. 2013]. 
Tonin, Mirco – Michael Vlassopoulos: An Experimental Investigation of Intrinsic 
Motivations for Giving, Discussion Papers in Economics and Econometrics 1008 
(2010) [http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/154439/, last access 19 Aug. 2013]. 
Tonin, Mirco – Michael Vlassopoulos: Social Incentives Matter: Evidence from an Online 
Real Effort Experiment, IZA Discussion Paper 6716 (2012) [http://ftp.iza.org/dp6716. 
pdf, last access 19 Aug. 2013]. 
Van de Klundert, Theo – Jeroen van de Ven: On the Viability of Gift Exchange in a Market 
Environment, Tilburg University – Center for Economic Research Discussion Paper 
1999-113 (1999) [http://ideas.repec.org/p/dgr/kubcen/1999113.html, last access 15 Aug. 
2013]. 
Van de Ven, Jeroen:  The Economics of the Gift, Working Paper (2000) [http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=244683, last access 19 Aug. 2013]. 
Vickrey, William: One Economist’s View of Philanthropy, in: Philanthropy and Public 
  
 
 
 
The Economics of the Gift    17 
Policy, ed. by Frank G. Dickinson, New York 1962, pp. 31-56.  
Von Kotzebue, Alexander – Berthold U. Wigger: Charitable Giving and Fundraising: 
When Beneficiaries Bother Benefactors, Working Paper (2008) [http://www.uni-
graz.at/socialpolitik/papers/von%20Kotzebue.pdf]. 
Waldfogel, Joel: The Deadweight Loss of Christmas, in: American Economic Review 83 
(1993), pp. 1328-1336. 
Walras, Léon: Eléments d’economie politique pure ou théorie de la richesse sociale, Paris 
19264 ; Engl. Transl. Elements of Pure Economics or the Theory of Social Wealth, 
London 1954. 
